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Abstract:  
This paper studies the steady-state costs of inflation in a general-equilibrium model 
with real per capita output growth and staggered nominal price and wage contracts. 
Our analysis shows that trend inflation has important effects on the economy when 
combined with nominal contracts and real output growth. Steady-state output and 
welfare losses are quantitatively important even for low values of trend inflation. 
Further, we show that nominal wage contracting is quantitatively more important than 
nominal price contracting in generating these losses. This important result does not 
arise from price dispersion per se but from an effect of nominal output growth on the 
optimal markup of monopolistically competitive labour suppliers. We also 
demonstrate that accounting for productivity growth is important for calculating the 
welfare costs of inflation. Indeed, the presence of two percent productivity growth 
increases the welfare costs of inflation in our benchmark specification by a factor of 
four relative to the no-growth case. 
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the welfare implications of trend ination in the presence
of nominal contracts and productivity growth. To this end, we formulate a
general-equilibrium model that incorporates staggered wage and price contracts
and has two key features.
First, we account for steady-state real per capita output growth since most,
if not all, industrialized economies exhibit positive trend real output growth. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to examine the welfare consequences
of ination in an environment where productivity growth and nominal wage and
price contracts are present.
Second, our model embeds Taylor (1979) style contracts for both prices and
wages.1 Fixed-duration nominal contracts have been found to be better suited
for analyzing the welfare costs of ination than the xed-hazard rate specica-
tions (such as Calvo (1983)) often used in the literature (see Ascari 2004). More-
over, the inclusion of two sources of nominal rigidity allows us to compare the
relative importance of each for the calculation of welfare. As well, an emerging
body of research has documented the importance of including rigidities in wage
decisions for the analysis of monetary policy and for building data-congruent
monetary models. Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) examine the welfare
costs of di¤erent monetary policy rules within a dynamic general-equilibrium
environment with staggered price and wage contracts. They report that the
presence of staggered nominal wage contracts have important implications for
optimal monetary policy. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) have ex-
amined the ability of a dynamic general-equilibrium model to match dynamic
responses of ination and real variables to a monetary policy shock. They nd,
inter alias, that sticky wages as opposed to prices is the critical nominal fric-
tion for replicating key moments in the data.2 Huang and Liu (2002) arrive at
similar conclusions when they examine the ability of price and wage contracts
to generate persistent real e¤ects after a monetary shock.
Despite the possible importance of nominal output growth for our under-
standing of the steady-state welfare costs of nominal wage and price contracting,
there is no work (to the best of our knowledge) that examines these features
in concert. Ascari (1998) and Graham and Snower (2004), for instance, study
the interaction of money growth rates and nominal wage rigidity in a model
that abstracts from sticky prices and real per capita output growth. King
and Wolman (1996) and Ascari (2004) examine the steady-state costs of trend
ination in general-equilibrium models that include only nominal goods price
rigidity. Finally, Wolman (2006) studies the determinants of optimal ination
in a two-good sticky-price model that encompasses relative productivity growth
in the two goods sectors.
We compute output and welfare costs of trend ination by comparing the
1Taylor (1999) emphasizes the importance of including both wage and price rigidities in
economic models.
2 Indeed, a version of the model with only sticky wages performs almost as well as the
estimated model with frictions in both nominal wages and prices.
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steady state of our model under a given rate of ination to the one that would
occur under the optimal rate. To preview our results, we report (consumption-
equivalent) welfare costs of ination that are sizable. We nd that trend ination
and productivity growth together induce output and welfare losses. Notably, the
presence of productivity growth leads to a prescription for deation at a rate
very close to the growth rate of the economy as the optimal rate of ination.
Further, the welfare costs of ination in a growing economy are increased by a
factor of four, relative to the case of no growth. The quantitative importance
of wage rigidity outweighs price rigidity by a wide margin in the computations
of these results. Intuitively, this arises not from relative price dispersion per
se but from a relatively little discussed e¤ect of trend ination on the optimal
markup of monopolistically competitive labour suppliers which we discuss more
fully in the paper. Our results about the quantitative importance of nominal
wage rigidity relative to price stickiness for computing optimal ination echo
those obtained in dynamic analyses such as Erceg et al. where a similar type of
staggered wage rigidity dominates the structure of optimal (dynamic) monetary
policy.3
It is important to note that our work, unlike much of the work on optimal
monetary policy, does not consider a role for "shoe-leather" costs of ination.
In other words, our model does not generate welfare losses associated with the
area under the money demand curve. We make this assumption as it allows us
to focus on the novel issue of trend ination in the presence of nominal wage
and price contracts and real productivity growth.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model used in our
simulations while the models steady state is described in Section 3. Section 4
presents the calibration of the model. Our results and discussion are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 then o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section we describe our model economy and the optimization problems
solved by rms and households. The underlying framework is an extension
of the model developed by Erceg et al. (2000) to study welfare and optimal
business-cycle monetary policy. In particular, we consider a steady-state version
of their model extended to account for non-zero trend ination and steady-state
real growth. We then use the modied model to study welfare and optimal
long-run monetary policy.
2.1 Firms and Price Setting
Final Good Production
The nal good, Yt, is produced by assembling a continuum of intermediate
goods Yjt for j 2 [0; 1] that are imperfect substitutes with a constant elasticity
3Similarly, Wolman (2006) develops a two-good sticky-price model and nds that the more
rigid price sector drives the results regarding optimal ination.
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of substitution ". The production function is constant-returns to scale and is
given by
Yt 
Z 1
0
Y
" 1
"
jt dj
 "
" 1
: (1)
Aggregate output Yt is allocated to consumption and investment by households,
so we have:
Ct + It = Yt; (2)
where choices of Ct and It are discussed below. The nal-good sector is com-
petitive; prot maximization leads to the following input-demand function for
the intermediate good j:
Yjt =

Pjt
Pt
 "
Yt; (3)
which represents the economy-wide demand for good j as a function of its rela-
tive price Pjt=Pt and of aggregate output Yt. Imposing the zero-prot condition
in the sector provides the nal-good price index Pt:
Pt =
Z 1
0
P jt
1 "dj
 1
1 "
: (4)
Intermediate Good Production
Intermediate-good producing rm j uses capital Kjt and labour Ljt to pro-
duce Yjt units of good, following a Cobb-Douglas production function viz.,
Yjt = (AtLjt)
Kjt
(1 ); (5)
where At is an economy-wide level of labour-augmenting technology and the
parameter  is the share of labour in production.
We assume that the aggregate level of technology is deterministic and grows
at the (gross) rate g  1 every period, so we have
At = g
tA0; A0 = 1: (6)
Capital is specic to the rm; each rms capital input at time t, Kjt; is pre-
determined as a result of past investment decisions. The rms current-period
investment Ijt increases its capital stock, following the standard accumulation
equation:
Kj;t+1 = (1  )Kjt + Ijt; (7)
with  the rate of depreciation on capital. In contrast, rms hire labour from a
spot market in which they are price takers; in that market, one unit of composite
labour is priced at Wt.
To introduce nominal price stickiness into the model, we assume that pro-
ducers of the di¤erentiated goods set prices according to Taylor-style staggered
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nominal contracts of xed duration. Specically, rms set the price of their
good for J quarters and price setting is staggered so that every period, a frac-
tion 1=J of rms is resetting prices. Further, the cohorts are xed, so the same
fraction 1=J of rms reset prices every J quarters together. Whether they are
changing their nominal price or not, however, all rms decide in every period
their labour input demand Ljt and investment Ijt.
Current-period (nominal) prots are paid as dividends Djt to the rms
owners:
Djt = PjtYjt   PtIjt  WtLjt: (8)
Each intermediate-good producing rm maximizes the discounted, expected sum
of future (real) dividends Djt=Pt. The relevant discount factor for dividends is
kt+k=t (the intertemporal rate of substitution of households) because house-
holds own all rms.4 The maximization problem thus consists of choosing prices
(every J quarters), labour input, and investment purchases in order to solve the
following problem:
maxEt
1X
k=0
(kt+k=t)

Pj;t+k
Pt+k
Yj;t+k   Ij;t+k   Wt+k
Pt+k
Lj;t+k

;
with respect to the economy-wide demand for product j (3), the production
function (5), and the capital accumulation equation (7).
The rst-order condition for labour input is:
Wt
Pt
1
At
= sjt

Yjt
AtLjt

; (9)
where sjt is the real marginal (labour) cost of increasing production, conditional
on the stock of installed capital.5 The rst-order condition for investment pur-
chases leads to:
1 = Et

(kt+k=t)

sj;t+1

(1  )Yj;t+1
Kj;t+1

+ 1  

: (10)
Anticipating the equilibrium result that the expected intertemporal rate of sub-
stitution Et
n
kt+k=t
o
equals the inverse of the real interest rate 1=(1 + rt),
(10) can be further reduced to
rt +  = Et

sj;t+1

(1  )Yj;t+1
Kj;t+1

; (11)
which states that rms invest up to the point where the opportunity cost of the
funds engaged in investment purchases equals the expected return from installed
capital next period.
4As t represents householdsmarginal utility of income, kt+k=t measures their valu-
ation of dividends received in period t+ k.
5sjt is the Lagrange multiplier for equation (5).
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Finally, the rst-order condition for P jt, the price chosen by rms that are
resetting in period t, is
Et
J 1X
=0
t+=t
 
(1  )

P jt
Pt+
 "
P 1t+Yt+ + sj;t+

P jt
Pt+
 " 1
P 1t+Yt+
!
= 0
(12)
After some algebra, this condition yields the following expression:
P jt =
"
"  1
Et
PJ 1
=0 
t+P
"
t+Yt+sj;t+
Et
PJ 1
=0 
t+P
" 1
t+ Yt+
: (13)
Since the Taylor pricing structure allocates rms within xed cohorts through
time, rms resetting prices all behave identically. We can therefore omit the j
subscript from the optimal price and write P t . In equilibrium, there are now
only J di¤erent prices in the economy and, following the denition in (4), the
aggregate price index Pt becomes:
Pt =
 
1
J
J 1X
=0
P t 
1 
! 1
1 
; (14)
where P t  is the optimal price of the 1=J portion of rms who reset their price
 periods ago.
2.2 Households and Wage Setting
Composite Labour
We assume the presence of a multi-agent, innitely-lived representative house-
hold. Each member i ( i 2 [0; 1]) of this extended household supplies Lit units
of di¤erentiated labour to labour aggregators. These rms assemble composite
labour from di¤erentiated, individual-specic labour according to the following
aggregation function:
Lt 
Z 1
0
L
 1

it di
 
 1
: (15)
where  represents a constant elasticity of substitution. Labour aggregators in
turn sell this composite labour to rms, at the economy-wide price (the aggre-
gate wage) Wt. Each unit of di¤erentiated labour Lit costs these aggregators
Wit, which is determined as part of the households optimization problem de-
scribed below. Labour aggregators are price takers in both their output and
input markets. Cost minimization, thus, leads to the following input demand
for type-i labour:
Lit =

Wit
Wt
 
Lt; (16)
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which is the economy-wide demand for type-i labour, as a function of its relative
wage Wit=Wt and of aggregate composite labour Lt. This sector is competitive;
imposing the resulting zero-prot condition for labour aggregators yields a def-
inition of the aggregate wage index Wt:
Wt =
Z 1
0
W it
1 di
 1
1 
: (17)
Household Optimization
The representative household receives utility from shared consumption, Ct,
and experiences disutility from supplying the di¤erentiated labour, Lit ( i 2
[0; 1]). Expected lifetime utility is
E0
1X
t=0
t
0@logCt    1Z
0
Lit
1+
1 + 
di
1A ; (18)
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor and the parameters , and  > 0.
Household revenues consist of labour earnings WitLit from each household
member, dividendsDjt (j 2 [0; 1]), derived from ownership of intermediate-good
producing rms (see below) and bond holdings Bt 1. These revenues must be
su¢ cient to cover consumption and new bond purchases, so that the budget
constraint is obeyed:
PtCt +
Bt
Rt
=
1Z
0
WitLitdi+
1Z
0
Djtdj +Bt 1; (19)
where Bt represents nominal bond holdings and Rt is the (gross) nominal inter-
est rate (1=Rt thus is the price of one-period, nominal discount bonds).
The household is assumed to set the wage for each of its membersdi¤eren-
tiated labour input in a staggered fashion, under assumptions similar to those
described above for price contracts. In particular, the duration of each wage
contract is xed for I periods and every period, a fraction 1=I of wages are
reset. The households intertemporal optimization problem is thus to choose
consumption, bond holdings, and wages (when resetting) in order to maximize
(18) with respect to aggregate demand for each type of labour (16) and the
budget constraint (19).
The rst-order conditions for Ct and Bt are standard and yield
t = C
 1
t ; (20)
1=Rt = Et

t+1
tt+1

; (21)
where t represents the gross rate of growth in the aggregate price index (t 
Pt=Pt 1) and t is the households marginal utility of (real) income, that is, the
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Lagrange multiplier for equation (19). The rst-order condition for wage, Wit,
when resetting, is
Et
I 1X
s=0
s
"


W it
Wt+s
 (1+)
(W it)
 1
L1+t+s + (1  )t+s

W it
Wt+s
 
P 1t+sLt+s
#
= 0;
(22)
where W jt is the optimal choice for the wage of type-i labour when resetting.
After some algebra, this expression yields
W it =
 

   1
Et
PI 1
s=0 
s
 
W t+sLt+s
+1
Et
PI 1
s=0 
st+s
 
W t+sLt+s=Pt+s
!
1
1+
: (23)
Since wage-setting cohorts are xed through time, all wages being reset are
xed equally and the i subscript on the optimal choice can be eliminated; we
therefore denote it W t . There are now only I di¤erent wages in the economy
and, following the denition in (17), the aggregate wage index Wt becomes:
Wt =
 
1
I
I 1X
s=0
 
W t s

1 
! 1
1 
(24)
where W t s is the period-t wage applying to the 1=I portion of di¤erentiated
labour that was reset s periods ago.
2.3 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy consists of a constant, targeted rate of (steady-state) ination
. This rate is to be consistent with equilibrium decisions of rms, so that in
the (balanced growth) steady state of the economy, we have
t  Pt
Pt 1
= ; 8t: (25)
This monetary policy can be interpreted as implemented by a interest rate
targeting rule or a money growth rule. Since we focus our analysis on the
balanced-growth steady-state of the economy, either interpretation is valid.6
There is no government taxation or spending in the model.
2.4 Price and Wage Dispersion
The extent of dispersion in price and wage present in the economy can poten-
tially be an important factor in understanding our results. Therefore, it is useful
to dene dispersion in prices of intermediate-goods as
6To interpret monetary policy through a money-growth rule, we need to reserve a role for
money in the model. This can be done, without changing any of our behavioral results, by
reserving a role for money balances in utility (in a separable form relative to consumption and
labour).
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pt =
1
J
J 1X
=0

Pt
Pt
 "
; (26)
and the dispersion in wages of di¤erentiated labour as
wt =
1
I
I 1X
s=0

Wst
Wt
 
: (27)
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium to this economy consists of allocations and prices such that
households, labour aggregators, nal-good producing rms and intermediate-
good producing rms optimize, the monetary policy rule (25) is satised, and
all markets clear.
We focus on cohort-symmetric equilibria in which all resetting, intermediate-
good producing rms choose the same price P jt for the good they produce. As
described above, this implies that only J di¤erent prices coexist in equilibrium
at any time. It also implies that the rms within each price-setting cohort are
characterized by identical demand for their product (so we can write Yt;  =
0; :::; J   1) and also identical input mix to satisfy demand (Lt;Kt;  =
0; :::; J   1).
This symmetry extends to wage choices. All wages W it reset in a given
period are equal and in equilibrium, the economy is characterized by I di¤erent
wages (Wst; s = 0; :::; I   1) and corresponding, di¤erentiated labour demand
(Lst; s = 0; :::; I   1).
Market Clearing
For the labour market to clear, total supply of the composite labour produced
by labour aggregators must equal total demand arising from intermediate-good
producing rms. Further, total investment purchases by these rms must cover
aggregate investment. We thus have the following market-clearing conditions:
Lt 
1Z
0
Ljtdj; It 
1Z
0
Ijtdj: (28)
Data Transformations
Allowing for a deterministic trend in the level of aggregate technology 
recall (6) implies that a balanced-growth path exists where aggregate output
Yt, aggregate consumption Ct, aggregate investment It and the real wageWt=Pt
all grow at the same rate g as technology. We transform these variables to
induce stationarity; this allows for a solution to the steady-state values of these
transformed variables:
yt  Yt
At
; ct  Ct
At
; it  It
At
; wt  Wt
Pt
1
At
: (29)
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Steady-state growth is also present at the level of intermediate-good pro-
ducing rms. That is, their production Yt,  = 0; :::; J   1 also grows at the
rate of technology. Correspondingly, individual investment purchases, as well
as their installed capital stock, also share this growth rate. Again, stationarity
is induced by dividing all these variables by the level of technology, so we have:
yt  Yt
At
; it  It
At
; kt  Kt
At
;  = 0; :::; J   1: (30)
Finally, trend ination means that newly-set prices P t and newly-set wages
W t are growing along the balanced-growth path. To induce stationarity and
facilitate the computation of the deterministic steady state of the economy, we
dene the choice of resetting agents, relative to economy-wide counterparts, as
follows:
pt 
P t
Pt
wt 
W t
Wt
; (31)
and modify equations (13), (14), (23) and (24) accordingly. Details on variable
transformations and their impact on the models equations are available from
the authors.
3 The steady state of the economy
Intermediate-good Production
Computing the deterministic steady-state of the economy rst involves rewrit-
ing production of each intermediate-good producing rm as follows:
y = L
k
(1 );  = 0; :::; J   1: (32)
whereas the rst-order conditions for labour choice (9) and for capital accumu-
lation (11), evaluated at steady state, yield
L = 
s
w

y ;  = 0; :::; J   1; (33)
k = (1  )

s
r + 

y ;  = 0; :::; J   1: (34)
Combining the last three expressions yields the following determination for the
marginal cost s :
s = s =
w

 r + 
1  
1 
; (35)
note that in our steady state, marginal cost is equated across all rms, irrespec-
tive of the last time they reset their price.
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Next we aggregate (32) to (34) by dening the following, simple-sum, pro-
duction and input aggregates:
y 
J 1X
=0
y ; k
 
J 1X
=0
k ; L
 
J 1X
=0
L : (36)
Since each rm uses the same capital-labour ratio and marginal cost is constant
across rms, simple algebra shows that (32) to (34) map over to the aggregate
level:
y = Lk(1 ); (37)
L = 
 s
w

y; (38)
k = (1  )

s
r + 

y: (39)
Prices
The denition of the aggregate price index in (14), evaluated at steady state,
allows us to solve for the newly-set price p as a function of steady-state ination
 and model parameters  and J :
p =
 
1
J
J 1X
=0
(" 1)
! 1
 1
: (40)
In turn, inserting this value for p into the optimal pricing equation (13) at
steady state leads to a solution for marginal cost s as a function of model
parameters:
s =
"
"  1

1
J
PJ 1
=0 
(" 1)
 1
 1 PJ 1
=0
 
" 1g
PJ 1
=0 (
"g)

: (41)
The expression in (26) dening price dispersion across intermediate goods be-
comes the following in steady state:
p =
1
J
PJ 1
=0 
"
1
J
PJ 1
=0 
(" 1)
 1
 1
: (42)
Using this expression, the market demand for each intermediate-good (3), and
the denition of y in (36) above establishes the following relationship between
y and y:
y = py; (43)
Note from this last expression that a high level y of production at the
rm level is not necessarily translated into high levels of GDP (y), but could
be instead dissipated into price dispersion p. This arises because e¢ cient
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production of the nal good requires equal amounts of each intermediate good
recall (1)whereas in practice these goods will be used in production according
to their relative price as in (3). Section 5 examines the quantitative importance
of this dissipatinge¤ect.
Wages
On the labour market side, the steady-state wage index, (24), implies that
we can solve for the optimal relative wage, w, as a function of model parameter
only, that is,
w =
 
1
I
I 1X
s=0
(g)s( 1)
! 1
 1
: (44)
Using similar logic as above, inserting this expression into (23), the condition
for optimal choice of wage, leads to the following expression, which links the
real wage w, aggregate consumption c, and aggregate composite labour L:
w =

   1cL

PI 1
s=0 
s(g)s(1+)PI 1
s=0 
s(g)s( 1)

1
I
PI 1
s=0(g)
s( 1)
 1+
 1
: (45)
Further, the expression in (27), dening wage dispersion, becomes the following
in steady state:
w =
1
I
PI 1
s=0(g)
s
1
I
PI 1
s=0(g)
s( 1)
 1
 1
: (46)
Finally, using this last expression, the market demand (16) for each labour
variety, and denition of L in (36) above establishes the following relationship
between L and L:
L = wL: (47)
Again, note from this expression that high levels of labour e¤ort at the individual
levels, in L, are not necessarily translated to high levels of composite labour L
but could instead be dissipated through dispersion in wage prices w.
In the following sections, the model parameters are calibrated, its steady
state computed and the e¤ects of trend ination on the economy are analyzed.
4 Calibration
In order to compute the steady state of the economy, numerical values are as-
signed to parameters. On the production side, the labour share parameter, ;
is set to 0:64 and the parameter ; representing capital depreciation, is set to
0:035, implying an annual rate of depreciation around 13 percent. The per
capita growth rate of the economy, g; is set to 1:005 or an annualized rate of
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output growth of 2 percent in our benchmark case. The elasticity of substi-
tution parameters for intermediate goods (") and di¤erentiated labour () are
both set to 11. These values imply steady-state markups of 10 percent in both
goods and labour markets in economies with zero ination and no growth, and
are consistent with the nding reported in Basu (1996) and Basu and Fernald
(1997). The disutility of labour parameter, , is initially assigned a value of
one, as in Hornstein and Wolman (2005). The length of price contracts J is set
to 2, based on results reported in Bils and Klenow (2004). Finally, the length
of wage contracts I is set equal to 4, as in Erceg et al. (2000) and Huang
and Liu (2002). Further support is found by Taylor (1999) who conducts a
review of the empirical literature and concludes that the average frequency of
wage changes is about one year, and Christiano et al. (2005) who estimate a
dynamic general-equilibrium model and nd average wage changes to be about
3:3 quarters.
Given the uncertainty around some of these parameter values, we will also
examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative calibrations. We view the
current calibration as capturing the midpoint of the ranges for the parameters
under consideration.
5 Results
This section presents the main ndings of the paper and is structured as follows.
The next subsection reports the optimal rate of long-run ination. Subsection
5.2 then compares the e¤ect of di¤erent levels of positive ination on the econ-
omy while intuition for the results is o¤ered in subsection 5.3. Subsection 5.4
presents results from a set of parameter perturbation experiments.
5.1 Levels of Optimal Ination
A natural question that arises for our analysis is: What is the optimal level of
ination admitted by the model described above? We dene the optimal level
of ination as the rate of ination that maximizes the (steady-state) welfare of
the household. We consider two versions of our model: (i) A no growth version
(g = 1); and (ii) a version with annual real per capita output growth to equal 2
percent (or g = 1:005). The former allows for comparison with previous studies
that do not incorporate steady-state growth in their analysis whereas the latter
will serve to emphasize the importance of output growth for determining the
optimal level of ination.
The no-growth version of the model admits an optimal ination rate of
0:04 percent (on an annualized basis). This result is similar in spirit to that
reported in Wolman (2001). Wolman studies optimal ination in a sticky-price
model and argues that a small degree of ination is necessary to o¤set some of
the monopoly distortion within his model. The result is also akin to that in
King and Wolman (1996), who report optimal ination to be greater than that
prescribed by the Friedman rule.
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The optimal ination rate is signicantly lower in the model version with
growth, approximately  1:9 percent per annum. This result is explained largely
by the e¤ect of trend ination o¤setting the wage markup distortion. Under the
model specication with growth, the wage markup distortion is eliminated when
=g = 1 or a deation rate of 1:96 percent per annum. This deation, however,
does not eliminate the price markup distortion which requires near-zero ina-
tion. Since the price markup distortion is not as important quantitatively, the
optimal annual ination rate settles at  1:9 percent, indicating that o¤setting
the wage markup distortion is the most welfare-enhancing policy. This conclu-
sion is the steady-state analog to the dynamic monetary policy result reported
in Erceg et al. (2000), in which the objective of eliminating the e¤ects of wage
rigidities is the prominent task for optimal monetary policy. Interestingly, we
arrive at a Friedman-rule-like result for optimal ination in a model without a
transactions role for money. Consistent with the standard Friedman-rule pre-
scription, our results call for deation to o¤set another (non-monetary) feature
the inability of nominal wages to freely adjust of the economy.
5.2 Output and Welfare Costs of Ination
The analysis focuses on the steady state of the economy using the calibration
described above. Throughout, we report results by pairing the steady state
computed with a given annual net ination rate to the one arising under the
optimal rate discussed above. We examine rates of ination up to the 4 percent
mark, which covers the empirical range of trend ination in many industrialized
economies over the last decade.
Figure 1 depicts the output costs of trend ination. The numbers along
the horizontal axis correspond to the rate of steady-state ination measured on
a net, annualized basis while the value on the vertical axis represents the loss
in output arising from the corresponding rate of ination, relative to the GDP
level occurring under optimal ination.7 The graphs can thus be interpreted
as presenting the output that would be gained by an economy moving from a
currently observed average ination rate of, say, 2 percent to the optimal.8 It
is apparent that the e¤ects of ination on the economy are sizeable. Although
the e¤ects are relatively modest at very low rates of positive trend ination, an
economy with 2 percent ination nonetheless admits output that is 0:77 percent
lower than the optimal-ination economy. At 4 percent ination, distortionary
e¤ects have increased to a point where output is reduced by 1:71 percent relative
to its optimal counterpart.
Figure 2 reveals that similar, sizeable e¤ects of trend ination are present
when welfare measures are presented. The gure presents the (consumption-
7Specically, the quantity on the vertical axis is 100(1   GDP=GDP= ), where 
represents the optimal rate of ination.
8This interpretation of the graph lessens the severity that Lucas-critique arguments can
have on our results. For example, the fact that we keep the length of wage contracts xed
throughout is not important if the experiment involves comparing the current, observed situa-
tion (with, say, 2 percent average ination) to the optimal (where the length of wage contracts
is largely irrelevant).
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equivalent) welfare loss of trend ination, measured by comparing steady states.9
Again, the e¤ects start out being relatively modest, although a 2 percent rate
of trend ination already causes welfare losses amounting to around 0:8 percent
of consumption. At 4 percent annual ination, the welfare losses have increased
to represent around 1:8 percent of consumption.
In order to identify the source of these sizeable e¤ects of trend ination,
Figure 3 and 4 report markup and relative price dispersion as a function of 
in the market for intermediate goods (Figure 3) and in the market for labour
(Figure 4). Figure 3 shows that distortions in the market for intermediate goods
are minimized at (essentially) zero ination. Ination rates higher, but also
lower, than this gure exacerbate the distortions in the goods market, and both
markups and price dispersion increase. However, the e¤ects are quantitatively
very small. The top panel shows the markup rising with positive trend ination,
but even at 4 percent ination this upward movement is extremely small and
the markup distortion is barely distinguishable (around 10:014 percent) from
its level in the zero ination benchmark (10:0 percent). Similarly, the price
dispersion measure (p), which is exactly one in the zero ination benchmark,
increases smoothly in trend ination but the magnitude of the increase is again
very small. Even under 4 percent trend ination, p increases by less than
0:015 percent relative to its optimal-ination benchmark.
Figure 4, analyzing the labour market, displays markedly di¤erent quantita-
tive patterns. The top panel of the gure shows that the markup in the market
for labour increases signicantly as ination increases. From its benchmark
level of 10 percent at the optimal rate, the labour wage markup quickly climbs
to 12 percent for 2 percent annual ination and to 14 percent when annual
ination is 4 percent. Ination, therefore, signicantly a¤ects the decision of
household wage setters. As ination increases, households choose increasingly
greater markups of wage over (utility) marginal costs, pricing themselves out
of the market (to avoid uctuating demand for their labour services) and, in
doing so, exacerbating the distortion that arises from the monopolistic nature
of labour supply. We discuss this e¤ect in more detail in the next section. As
a result of these responses of wage setters to ination, relative wage distortions
remains a quantitatively modest phenomenon, as evidenced by the bottom panel
of Figure 4. Overall, these results accord well with the conclusions reported
in Christiano et al. (2005) and Huang and Liu (2002) regarding the crucial
role of nominal wage rigidity for understanding the e¤ects of monetary policy.
The results also support the conclusion in Erceg et al. (2000) regarding the
importance of staggered nominal wage contracts for economic welfare as well as
understanding optimal monetary policy.
5.3 Discussion
Firms and households in this economy make constrained choices: Although
they would like to re-optimize every period, the price they choose today will
9Appendix A details how the measure for welfare loss is constructed.
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prevail for the length of the contract and they are thus unable to achieve their
desired markups every period. In an environment with positive trend ination,
the relative price chosen by a price (wage) setter will decrease as the contract
progresses. In the early periods of the contract, relative prices will tend to be
higher, resulting in lower demand but higher markup. In the later stages of a
contract, the relative price will be lower, delivering greater demand but lower
per unit markup.
To develop intuition for our results, Figure 5 plots prot for a given intermediate-
good producer (full line), and utility for a given wage setter (dashed line) from
our model.10 The gure highlights an important di¤erence in the shape of the
prot and utility functions around the optimum, viz., the utility function of wage
setters is strongly asymmetrical around the optimum while the prot function
of intermediate-good producing rms is not. This asymmetry around optimal
choices is the key to understanding the relationship between markups and posi-
tive trend ination as well as di¤erences in the magnitude of e¤ects arising from
nominal price and wage contracts. The asymmetry arises from our assumption
regarding the labour and goods aggregator. In particular, we use an aggregator
developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that admits non-linear demand curves
for labour and goods and, as an artifact, asymmetry in the prot and utility
functions. The degree of asymmetry is then controlled by our calibration.11
Owing to their inability to reoptimize, rms and households nd themselves at
di¤erent points along these prot or utility functions over the course of their
contracts; the shape of these functions is thus a key factor determining pricing
behaviour. Consider rst the households problem. Lower relative wages lead
to high levels of labour demand and rapidly decreasing utility (recall (18)). To
avoid these periods of low relative wages and high demand for their labour,
households increase their markup, so that the range of relative prices over the
course of their contract shifts to the right of the optimum. In contrast, this
mechanism has a quantitatively negligible e¤ect on the pricing behaviour of
rms as rm-specic marginal cost is constant even in periods of relatively low
price and high demand for their goods. Hence, the region of rapidly decreasing
prots, at the left of the optimum in Figure 5, is considerably more pronounced
for wage setters than for price setters.
To summarize, the asymmetry implies that rms (households) choose a
higher markup of price over marginal cost (wage over the marginal rate of sub-
stitution) when ination is positive, because prots (utility) decline faster with
a markup that is below the optimum than with a markup above the optimum.
This e¤ect is quantitatively sizeable for households and wages, but very mod-
est for rms and prices. Reducing trend ination reduces the impact of this
asymmetry on markups. Said otherwise, higher trend ination, by increasing
markups, increases the monopoly distortion that is already present in the model
10More specically, the gure depicts the objective functions in a one-period, unconstrained
maximization problem for a monopolist whose demand and cost structures are similar to those
facing rms (full lines) and households (dashed lines) in our economy.
11 In the senstivity analysis below, we consider the case where the degree of asymmetry in
the goods and labour markets is identical (that is,  = 0).
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owing to imperfect competition. Moreover, in the presence of trend ination
and nominal wage contracts, each non-adjusting wage cohort sees its relative real
wage become lower as the price level rises in each period. This cohort receives
relatively higher demand for its labour than the other higher-priced cohorts and
average real wage across cohorts falls. This substitution towards the lower
cost labour (and away from higher wage labour) is, however, ine¢ cient because
labour is imperfectly substitutable. Thus, the greater degree of labour churn-
ing associated with higher rates of trend ination leads to lower average labour
productivity and lower steady-state output.12
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 1 and 2 present results from a set of parameter perturbation experiments.
These experiments repeat the analysis presented above in Figures 1 and 2 for
each new set of parameter values. In Table 1 we present the economic costs of
2 percent annual ination and in Table 2 the same costs under 4 percent annual
ination (Table 2). The rst column in each table describes the parameter
that is modied and its new value. The second column displays the optimal
ination rate according to the specication analyzed and serves as the point of
comparison to compute the costs of ination. Finally, the values in the third
and fourth columns represent losses in output (column 3) and welfare (column
4), relative to the optimal ination case. In order to facilitate comparison of
the results, the rst row reproduces the output and welfare losses arising from
our benchmark calibration.
The inuence of technology growth
The second and third rows of the tables consider di¤erent rates of steady-
state productivity growth. It is readily apparent that real per capita growth
is an important element in understanding the costs of nominal contracting. In
particular, the tables reveal that in an environment with higher rates of growth,
the output and welfare costs of trend ination increase considerably. Indeed,
with steady-state ination at 2 percent, an increase in real per capita growth,
from 2 percent (the benchmark) to 3 percent, worsens output and welfare losses
of ination by almost 60 percent, from 0:8 percent to around 1:2 percent.
In the no-growth version of our model, by contrast, output and welfare costs
of trend ination are reduced by a factor of around four, to 0:2 percent. The
intuition underlying this interaction between technological and nominal (price)
growth is very similar that described above for nominal contracts. Recall that
households do not want their contract wage to become "too low" relative to
12We note that under full indexation, output is independent of trend ination. Full index-
ation eliminates the markup distortions leading price and wage setters to choose an optimal
markup instead of a distortionary markup beyond the optimum. Under the no-growth case,
wages and prices would need to be fully indexed to lagged or steady-state ination, or some
combination of the two to o¤set the markup distortions. Under the postive growth case,
prices and wages would need to be fully indexed to ination and productivity growth to
induce output growth to be independent of trend ination.
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others in the economy because it leads to rapidly decreasing utility. In a no-
growth environment, ination is the only potential source of this costly wage
dispersion so trend ination at 2 percent moves the economy only modestly
away from the no-dispersion optimum resulting in relatively small output and
welfare losses. When growth is present, however, wage setters consider not only
the e¤ect of trend ination but also that of technology growth on their relative
wage over the duration of their contract. In such an environment, trend ination
and productivity growth work in the same direction to push utility further to
the left where utility is declining rapidly, thus exacerbating the distortion arising
from only ination. As a result, wage markups react more strongly to trend
ination leading to a greater degree of monopoly distortion than is present in
the no-growth model. Productivity growth has virtually no e¤ect on the goods
market since prices, unlike wages, do not rise with productivity growth. Finally,
note from Table 2 that the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of growth
is not as acute when trend ination increases to 4 percent as the e¤ects arising
from higher ination start to dominate the e¤ects from productivity growth.
The inuence of utility parameters
The following two rows of Table 1 and Table 2 explore the importance of
curvature in the disutility of labour. First, the tables show that a rise in the
preference for smooth labour a rise of  from its benchmark value of 1 to 2
 increases signicantly the output and welfare costs of trend ination. The
output costs of 2 percent ination almost double, from 0:8 percent of GDP in
the benchmark to 1:5 percent. Such a strong e¤ects is to be expected from
our analysis of Figure 5. Increasing the value of  exacerbates the asymmetry
of (utility) prots around the optimum, leading households to increase their
markups when they reoptimize. Correspondingly, completely eliminating the
desire for smoothness of labour (setting  to 0) leads to a sharp decline in
the costs of trend ination. Table 1 shows, for example, that in this extreme
case trend ination at an annual rate of 2 percent carries output costs of less
than 0:1 percent. Overall, these two rows of Table 1 and Table 2 underline
the key importance of adequately modelling the interaction between nominal
contracting and the labour market to measure the costs of trend ination.
The inuence of labour market parameters
Rows 6 to 9 of the tables report further evidence supporting the importance
of nominal wage rigidity for our results. Row 6 reports the consequences of
decreasing the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated labour varieties,
from  = 11 (benchmark) to  = 5. This is equivalent to increasing the markup
from 10 to 25 percent in a zero-ination, zero-growth economy. In this new
environment, the monopoly power of households is strong and they maintain
already higher markups. Ination brings an additional distortion by pushing
the markup even further away, but this e¤ect is now subdued, as the original
markup was much higher than in the benchmark case. As a result, the output
costs of 2 percent ination are noticeably smaller, at around 0:2 percent.
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Rows 7 and 8 report experiments where the length of wage contracts is
modied, rst increasing it from 4 to 6 quarters (row 7) and then reducing it
from 4 quarters to 1 (row 8). These results demonstrate that wage contracts
is one important key to our results (when v > 0), as welfare and output losses
increase substantially in the longer wage contract case and fall greatly in the
no-wage contract calibration. Finally, the duration of price and wage contract
are set to an equal length of four quarters and the results are reported in row
9. They indicate the unimportance of price contracts for the current model as
the relative welfare and output losses are virtually identical to the benchmark
where the price contracts were set to two quarters.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the welfare costs of trend ination in the presence
of nominal price and wage contracts and real per capita output growth. To
this end, we develop a general-equilibrium environment based on Erceg et al.
(2000), modied to account for the possible e¤ects of non-zero trend ination
and real per capita output growth on economic welfare. In this sense, the same
labour market mechanism that gives rise to large dynamic welfare costs reported
in Erceg et al. is at work in the present analysis. Our calculations of the
welfare costs of ination suggest that in such an environment with productivity
growth, steady-state ination at relatively modest annual rates of 2 percent or
4 percent have signicant e¤ects on the economy. We nd that the quantitative
importance of wage rigidity outweighs by a wide margin that of price rigidity
in the computations of welfare costs. This important result does not arise from
price dispersion per se but from e¤ect of trend ination on the optimal markup
of monopolistically competitive labour suppliers. In particular, the inherent
asymmetry in the utility function around the optimum utility declines faster
with a wage below the optimum than with a markup above the optimum leads
households to choose a higher average markup of wage over the marginal rate
of substitution. This higher markup is equivalent to increasing the monopoly
distortion that is already present in the model owing to imperfect competition.
As well, we nd that real output growth imparts an important e¤ect on our
welfare calculations. Indeed, a two percent rate of productivity growth leads,
in our model, to welfare costs of ination that are four times as important as
those in the zero growth case.
Our analysis suggests at least two issues that merit further investigation.
First, our results are based on the inherent features of a model that abstracts
from strategic complementarity in price setting; by relaxing this assumption,
subsequent research can study the implications of factor specicity for the
steady-state welfare e¤ects of trend ination.13 Second, the welfare costs of
ination are likely to be sensitive to assumptions regarding the structure of the
labour market. In this paper, we followed Christiano et al. (2005) and Erceg et
13 In our benchmark model (with v = 1) there is an element of strategic complementarity in
wage setting (see Huang and Liu (2002)).
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al. (2000), among others, and model the labour market as allocative. Allowing
for richer non-allocative markets may change the welfare costs of trend ination
arising from labour market frictions.
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Figure 1: Output Costs of Trend Ination
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Figure 2: Welfare Cost of Trend Ination
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Figure 3: Markup and Price Dispersion in Market for Intermediate
Goods
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Figure 4: Markup and Wage Dispersion in Market for Labour
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Figure 5: Asymmetry of the Monopolists Prots around Optimum
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Table 1: Output and Welfare Costs From 2 Percent Annual Ination
(Relative to Optimal Ination Rate)
Model Optimal Output Welfare
Parameterization Ination (in %) (in %)
1. Benchmark  1:90 0:77 0:80
2. No Growth (g = 0) 0:039 0:17 0:20
3. Higher Trend Growth (g = 3:0)  2:82 1:21 1:23
4. High curvature in Labour Disutility ( = 2)  1:94 1:47 1:52
5. No curvature in Labour Disutility ( = 0)  1:48 0:06 0:07
6. Lower elasticity in labour market ( = 5)  1:71 0:17 0:18
7. Longer Wage Contracts (I = 6)  1:94 1:77 1:85
8. No Wage Contracts (I = 1) 0:039 0:005 0:005
9. Equal Price and Wage Contracts (J = I = 4)  1:71 0:77 0:80
Table 2: Output and Welfare Costs From 4 Percent Annual Ination
(Relative to Optimal Ination Rate)
Model Optimal Output Welfare
Parameterization Ination (in %) (in %)
1. Benchmark  1:90 1:71 1:77
2. No Growth (g = 0) 0:039 0:74 0:79
3. Higher Trend Growth (g = 3:0)  2:82 2:33 2:39
4. High curvature in Labour Disutility ( = 2)  1:94 3:21 3:35
5. No curvature in Labour Disutility ( = 0)  1:48 0:16 0:16
6. Lower elasticity in labour market ( = 5)  1:71 0:40 0:42
7. Longer Wage Contracts (I = 6)  1:94 3:83 4:05
8. No Wage Contracts (I = 1) 0:039 0:02 0:02
9. Equal Price and Wage Contracts (J = I = 4)  1:71 1:71 1:84
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A Welfare Computations
Recall the expression for expected lifetime utility of the extended representative
household (18):
U = E0
1X
t=0
t
0@logCt    1Z
0
Lit
1+
1 + 
di
1A : (48)
This expression can be rewritten as the following once it is evaluated at the
steady state:
U = E0
1X
t=0
t

log c  
1 + 
1
I
XI 1
s=0
Ls
1+

= (1=1  )

log c  
1 + 
1
I
XI 1
s=0
Ls
1+

where Ls represents the labour supply of the 1=I fraction of the households
members whose wage was modied s periods ago.
Consider now computing lifetime utility for a given benchmark level of in-
ation , as follows:
U = (1=1  )

log c   
1 + 
1
I
XI 1
s=0
Ls;
1+

;
where the subscript  indicates the dependence of that variable on the rate of
trend ination. Alternatively, consider lifetime utility at another rate of trend
ination , in which, consumption is increased at every period by the factor x:
U = (1=1  )

log(c(1 + x))  
1 + 
1
I
XI 1
s=0
Ls;
1+

:
The consumption equivalent measure of welfare changes between U and U
is the value of x which makes the two welfare measure equal. In other words, x
represents the percentage increase in consumption which would make households
indi¤erent between living in the (steady-state) economy with ination  and the
economy with the benchmark ination rate . Considering the two expressions,
we can solve for x as follows:
x = 100

exp

log(
c0
c
)  
1 + 
dL0  dL  1 ;
where we have cL  1
I
XI 1
s=0
Ls;
1+:
Using the steady-state values for expressions (16), (29), and (31) in the text,
this reduces to:
cL = w L1+ 1
I
XI 1
s=0
(g)s(1+):
We compute the value of x for all rates of trend ination from the optimal
rate  to  = 4 percent.
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